Development of the universe as it presenlt exist from a former state. Both types of evolution interest the philosopher because of the principles of sufficeint reason and causality. Evolution is a factual problem which must be solved primarily by the natural science. Even if one accepts the fact of evolution, evolution presupposes the things which evolve, whether these things be organisms or celetial matter: evolution cannot occur unless something exists which can evolve.

What is at stake is the origin, the first beginning, of things, not their subsequent change and development. If the universe is a development of matter which has existed from eternity without a beginning, it is evidently not a created universe; on the other hand, however if it had a beginning in time, it is evidently a created universe. The question, therefore is this: must we accept creation as the logical explanation of the existence of the universe?

The Jews always maintained that the world was created by God. The first line of the book of genesis states expressly: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” To create was understood in the sense of a ‘production out of nothing’.

PROOF OF CREATION

In proving creation, the purpose is not to prove how God produced things out of nothing, but simply to prove that God produced them in this manner. The fact of creation is whar must be proved, and this fact is proved as follows.

For anything to be produced by God, it must be intrinsically possible involving no contradiction in the constitutive elements of its concept. God is omnipotent; and to be omnipotent means that the infinte power of God can produce (give existence to) whatever is intrinsically possible, that is, to anything which does not involve a contradiction in the constitutive elements of its concept. Now, the concept of ‘producing a thing out of nothing’ involves no contradiction. The crux of the whole problem resides in the last statement; hence, it cannot be accepted without proof and this proof must now be given.

The concept of creation is not self-contradictory, like the idea of a square circle or of an inimate-inanimate organism. The ‘produciton’ of things is a common occurancein the world. New beings are continually being produced, as is evidenced by daily experience. They originate through change and generatiom through the casual efficiency of other beings. Atoms are made and unmade; chemical compounds are formed and dissolved; plants, animals, and men come into existence and die. In every suchinstance of ‘production’ , of course a pre-existent substrate of some kind is present. ‘production’ itself, therefore, offers no difficulty: ‘what is, can be’. But production ‘out of nothing’ contains no more contradictions than mere ‘production’ itself, when it is question of the first origin of finite beings. Everything in this world is finite and contigent; that was shown in the proof for God’s existnece. Now, ‘finite’ and ‘contingent’ beings does not have the sufficient reason for its existence in itself; or such a being would be ‘infinite’ and ‘necessary’. Since all being in this world are finite and contingent, they must have the sufficient reason for their existence in a being being outside the world; namely,in the infite and necessary being of God. But if they have the sufficient reason for their existence in God, that means that God gave them existence, that God brought them from non-existene to existence. However, outside of ‘everything in this world’ there is nothing but God. Therefore, if he gives them existence, can give them existence by ‘producing them without a pre-existing subject,’ that is to say, ‘out of nothing’. In fact, there is no other way that God can bring about the first origin of the contigent beings of this world. ‘Production’ in the strict sense of the world as ‘giving existence to a new being’ necessary includes the concept of ‘efficient cause’; but the concept of the ‘preexistnet subject (material cause)’ out of which the new being is effected is neither included nor excluded. The elements of ‘effiecient cause’ and the ‘absence of a pre-existing subject’ are thus seen to be compatible, atleast in the omnipotence of God. It follows then, ‘efficient cause’ and ‘production out of nothing’, since they are not contradictory, may be united into the single concept of ‘creation’ without contradiction. Creation, therefore must be intrinsically possible because it involves no contradiction in the concept.

Now omnipotence can perform anything inrinsically possible. Creation however is intrinsically psossilbe as has just been shown. Consequently, creation is possible to God.

**Proving that creation is a fact**; God therefore can create. The entire universe is contingent, because the universe is nothting more than the sum of all the beings which form the parts of it, and all the single beings in the universe are not necessary but contingent. Hence, the entire universe must have had its first orign from God. In other words, the entire universe must have been produced out of nothing. One cannot say that the entire universe was made out of pre-existent matter, had to be given existence through the efficient causality of God’s omnipotence, it had to be ‘produced out of nothing’. But the universe exists. Therefore, its first origin could not have been achieved except through a prodution out of nothing. That, however is creation, consequently, ‘creation is a fact’.

That fact creation also follows from the infinite perfection of God’s power. Being infinitely perfect, it must be absolutely independent of any assistance in the exercise of its efficient causality. Hence, Gods power must have been absolutely independent of any pre-existent subject, such as primordial matter.

Gof therefore, created the world out of nothing. Creation is necessary for the first origin of things.

The reason why creation is necessary for the first origin of things is not difficult to find. Whnever creatural beings produce something, production always the result of changing one kind of thing itno another kind of thinf, it is changing of a ‘this to a that’. But in the case of the first origin of things, the whole being of these things is involved, not merely a ‘this and a that’. Hence, in the case of the first origin of things, they cannot be produced by mere changes.

St. Thomas expressed this truth very admirably when he said: “we must consider not only the emanation of a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause which is God and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds from particular emanation, is not presupposedto that emanation; as whena man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from not-man, and white from not-white. Hence, if the emanation of the whole universe being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being br presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from not-being which is not-man, so creation, which is the emanation of all being (emanatio totius esse), is from the not-being which is nothing…. If therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above (Q 44, AA1, 2), that nothing can be unless it is from God, who is the universal cause of all being. Hence, it is necessary to say that God brings things into being from nothing.

GOD ALONE CAN CREATE

The questions to be answered are these: Can God alone create? Can a creature act as th pricipal cause of creation? Can a craetruer act as an instrumental cause of craetion? The pertinent terms are obviously ‘principal cause’ and ‘instrumental cause’.

A Principal cause is one which has a fully proportionate and sufficient power to produce the entire effect either alone or by using something else as instrumental cause in its productive act.

An instrumental cause is insufficient of itself to produce the entire effect but casually influences the productin of the effect under the direction and in the service of another (the principal) cause. A normal person, for instance, has the power to open his eyes in order to see; his own power is fully proportionate and sufficient to produce the effect of opening his eyes, and he does not need the assistance of any other thing to produce this effect. This same person in order to drive a nail into a board; uses the instrumentallity of a hammer; he is the ‘principal cause’ of this effect, because without his causality the hammer would not function. The hammer is the ‘instrumental cause’ because its peculiar causality of driving the nail into the board is used under the direction and in the service of the person acting as th eprincipal cause.

To determine whether a creature can be either principal or the instrumental cause of creation.

God of course, can creat; that has been established. The question then arises: can a creature be either the principal or the instrumental cause of creation? In answering this question, the matter under consideration refers to the natural power of a creature. Whether a creature can exert instrumental creative power in the supernatural field is a disputed question which does not properly belong to philosophy.

No creataion can be the principal cause of creation

No creature can be the principal cause of creation. Creative power does not produce a particular kimd of being, but being as such (esse qua esse). This is clear, whether we view the creaative act in its starting point or in the terminal point.

Viewed in its starting-point (terminus a quo), the creative act begins with not-being as such, because there is nothing present from which the created being is produced. To this ‘not-being as such’ is oppsed, not specific kind of being, a this or that but simply and absolutely ‘being as such’. Viewed in its terminal point (terminus ad quem), namely, in the effect of the creative act. The effect is being as such, because that which is produced is always ‘being as suc’ and not merely a particular kind of being. True, creation produces this or that kind of reality, so that a definite, specific kind of being receives existence; but peculiar and proper effect of creation is the production of the first thing(primum esse) of the whole thing, since the latter existed in no way and in no part before. Change and generation can produce a definite, specific kind of being (for instance, man can generate man), but it cannot confer ‘being as such’ to the new reality.

Now, the most universal effect demands aas its sufficient reason the most universal cause. But ‘being as such’ (ens qua ens, or esees qua esse) is the most universal effect, because it enters in the concept and essence of everything real and possible. Hence, creative power must be able to produce everything that is real and possible. Such a power , however must be infinite, because the store of possible imitaations of God’s infinite perfections is inexhaustible. Hence, if a creatural being could be the principal cause of the creative act, it would have to be capable of giving existence to everything real and possible. That, however, necessarily exceeds the power of any and every creatural thing, because its very being, and consequently also its power, is something essentially finite and limited. God alone is infinite, and there can be no more than one infinite being. Hence, no creatural thing can possess infinite power, so that it would or could be the principal cause of creation. It follows, therefore, that no creature can, in its natural capacity, be the principal cause in the creative production of any reality.

No creature can be the instrumental cause of creation.

Nor can the creature be the instrumental cause of creation. In oreder that somethhing be an instrumental cause in a productive action, tiwould really have to influence the effect casually, according to whatever way it acts as an instrument. A hammer, for instance, contributes its share toward the production of the total effect by pounding; a knife by cutting; and so with every tyoe of instrumentacting as a partial cause. An instrumental cause acts only under the direction o, and in the service of, a rpincipal cause; but it must contribute its influences, in its own cahrateristic wawy, according to its nature.

Now, in the creative act this effect of the instrumental causality of the creature would have to either precede or follow or accompany the effect of the principal cause (God). But none of thses alternatives is possible. The charateristic effect of the instrumental causality could be directed. It cannnot follow, because, once God as the principal cause has effected creation, there is nothing afterward for the instrumental cause to effect. It cannot accompany Gods creative action: it would haave to produce the entire existence of the created being, since existence is an indivisible reality and then it would be the principal cause; or it would produce existence at all, since existence is an indivisibel reality, and then it is no cause whatsoever. Now, a creatural being cannot be the principal cause of creation. Consequently, no creature can be the instrumental cause of creation.

God alone can craete. Thid conclusion is a necessary consequence from what has just been said. If the creatural being is neither the principal not the instrumental cause of creation, it simpy cannot create. But it us neither the principal not the instrumental cause of creation. Therefore, a creatural being cannot create. God, however, can crete. And since no other being can craete, He alone can create. Creation, therefore, is the essential and incommunicable priviledge of the omnipotent power of God.

The Instrumental Causality of the Creature would have to either

-Procede

-Accompany

-Follow